









BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN



BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE

The Battles of Chattanooga  	
Belligerents	
 United States (Union)	 Confederate States (Confederacy)
Commanders and leaders	
MG Ulysses S Grant <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MG George H Thomas • MG Joseph Hooker • MG William Sherman 	General Braxton Bragg <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LTG William Hardee • MG John Breckenridge
Units involved	
56,000 engaged Military Division of the Mississippi <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Army of the Cumberland • Hooker's Command (Army of the Potomac) • Army of the Tennessee 	44,000 engaged Army of Tennessee
Casualties and losses	
686 KIA: 4,329 WIA: 322 CIA/MIA 5,337 casualties (9.5% of total)	361 KIA: 2,160 WIA: 4,000-6,000 CIA/MIA 6,500 – 8,500 casualties (15 - 19% of total)

The Tennessee Campaign: Stones River to Chattanooga December 1862 to November 1863

Part V: The Battles of Chattanooga

Presented by Howard Leemon

The Army of the Cumberland

The Army of the Cumberland (1)

- MG George Thomas had replaced Rosecrans
- MG John Palmer had replaced Thomas in command of the XIV Corps
- The XX and XXI Corps were combined with the Reserve Corps into a new IV Corps under the command of MG Gordon Granger
- Granger's initiative in bringing his Reserve Corps to the rescue of Thomas in defiance of orders had been rewarded
- 11 divisions were reorganised into 6, 3 in each Corps
- BG Absalom Baird, BG Jefferson Davis, BG Richard Johnson, MG Philip Sheridan, BG Thomas Wood all retained divisional commands
- BG Charles Cruft was promoted from brigade to divisional command

The Army of the Cumberland (2)

- BG John Brannan, who had put together the defence of Horseshoe Ridge from bits and pieces of the army, was made Head of the Artillery Reserve
- MG Joseph Reynolds, who had generally performed well at Chickamauga but started to lose his nerve late on the final day, was made Chief of Staff to Thomas
- BG Horatio Van Cleve and BG James Steedman were given important garrison roles at Nashville and Murfreesboro protecting the supply lines
- BG James Negley, who had left the field at Chickamauga in order to protect the baggage train and artillery without first telling Thomas, was removed from command – and sent north, for his health
- The command structure would be changed prior to the battles, but, as of 1 November, the commands were as follows:

The Army of the Cumberland (3)

MG George Thomas

➤ **IV Corps** under MG Gordon Granger

- ✧ BG Charles Cruft - BG Walter Whitaker, Col William Grose
- ✧ MG Philip Sheridan - Col Francis Sherman, BG George Wagner, Col Charles Harker
- ✧ BG Thomas Wood - BG August Willich, BG William Hazen, BG Samuel Beatty

➤ **XIV Corps** under MG John Palmer

- ✧ BG Richard Johnson – BG William Carlin, BG John King / Col William Stoughton, BG John Starkweather
- ✧ BG Jefferson Davis – BG James Morgan, BG John Beatty, Col Daniel McCook
- ✧ BG Absolom Baird – BG John Turchin, Col Ferdinand Van Derveer, Col Edward Phelps

Hooker's Command

MG Joseph Hooker

- **XI Corps** under MG Oliver O. Howard
 - ✧ BG Adolph von Steinwehr - Col Adolphus Buschbeck, Col Orland Smith
 - ✧ MG Carl Schurz - BG Hector Tyndale, Col Włodzimierz Krzyzanowski, Col Friedrich Hecker
- **XII Corps**
 - ✧ BG John W. Geary - Col George Cobham, BG George Greene

The Army of Tennessee

MG William Sherman

- **XV Corps** under MG Francis Blair
 - ✧ BG Peter Osterhaus - BG Charles Woods, Col James Williamson
 - ✧ BG Morgan Smith - BG Giles Smith, BG Joseph Lightburn
 - ✧ BG Hugh Ewing - Col John Loomis, BG John Corse, Col Joseph Cockerill
- **XVII Corps**
 - ✧ BG John Smith - Col Jesse Alexander, Col Green Raum, BG Charles Matthies

Bragg

The Army of the Tennessee (1)

The command structure would change prior to the battles, but, as of 1 November, the commands were as follows:

Gen Braxton Bragg

➤ Hardee's Corps under LTG William Hardee

- ✧ MG Benjamin Cheatham – BG John Jackson, BG John Moore, BG Edward Walthall, BG Marcus Wright
- ✧ BG Patton Anderson (Hindman's Division) – Col William Tucker (Anderson's Brigade), BG Arthur Manigault, BG Zach Deas, BG Alfred Vaughan
- ✧ BG States Rights Gist (Walker's Division) – BG George Maney, Gist's Brigade, Wilson's Brigade
- ✧ BG Bushrod Johnson (Buckner's Division) – Col John Fulton (Johnson's Brigade), BG Archibald Gracie, BG Alexander Reynolds

The Army of the Tennessee (2)

- Breckinridge's Corps under MG John Breckinridge
 - ✧ MG Patrick Cleburne – Col Daniel Govan (Liddell's Brigade), BG James Smith, BG Lucius Polk, BG Mark Lowrey
 - ✧ MG Alexander Stewart – Col Randall Gibson (Adams' Brigade), BG Otto Strahl, Col James Holtzclaw (Clayton's Brigade), BG Marcellus Stovall
 - ✧ BG William Bate (Breckenridge's Division) – BG Joseph Lewis, Col Robert Tyler (Bate's Brigade), BG Jesse Finley
 - ✧ MG Carter Stevenson – BG John Brown, BG Alfred Cumming, BG Edmund Pettus
- Wheeler's Cavalry Corps under MG Joseph Wheeler

Longstreet's Command

LTG James Longstreet

- ✧ MG Lafayette McLaws – BG Joseph Kershaw, Col Solon Ruff, BG Benjamin Humphreys, BG Goode Bryan
- ✧ MG Micah Jenkins (Hood's Division) – Col John Bratton, BG Evander Law, BG Jerome Robertson, BG George Anderson, BG Henry Benning

Bragg

- With the Cracker Line now open and the siege effectively lifted, Bragg seemed not have any strategy for dealing with it
- Instead, he decided that he could resolve the Longstreet problem by taking up President Davis's recent suggestion
- 3 November, Bragg called a council of war and gave orders to Longstreet to move out immediately "to drive Burnside out of East Tennessee first, or better, to capture or destroy him" and to repair the railway
- Longstreet was appalled:
 - He would have significantly fewer troops than Burnside
 - The timing was flawed with Sherman now coming up
 - He had proposed this a month ago when it had made some sense
- Bragg did, however, send most of Wheeler's Cavalry Corps with Longstreet, retaining about 500 - too few to do full reconnaissance

Sherman

William Tecumseh Sherman




- Born 1820 in Ohio
- West Point graduate, close friend of George Thomas
- Served in the 2nd Seminole War
- Resigned and went into business
- In 1859 became superintendent of a military academy in Louisiana but resigned when war broke out
- While friendly to southerners, he was strongly opposed to secession
- He travelled widely in his spare time, and his local knowledge would come in handy later
- Highly strung and talkative, he was prone to depression
- His early military exploits were mixed but he became Grant's most reliable subordinate and a natural leader
- In his conception and practice of total war, he was way ahead of his time

Sherman (1)

- 23 September, Sherman received an order from Grant to bring 3 divisions north to Memphis, collect 2 more and bring them west via Corinth on the Memphis & Charleston railroad which he was to repair as he went
- Sherman encouraged his troops to forage rather than draw on supplies
- Grant had done this during his march on Vicksburg when he abandoned his supply line once he was east of the Mississippi
- But Sherman identified a strategic objective
- "I never saw such greedy rascals after chicken and fresh meat. I don't believe I will draw anything for them but salt. I don't know but it would be a good plan to march my army back and forth from Florence to Stevenson to make a belt of devastation between the enemy and our country."
- 12 months later he was to apply this thinking on a much grander scale while marching through Georgia

Sherman (2)

- Progress was slow until Sherman received an order from Grant to abandon the repair of the Memphis & Charleston and move as quickly as possible to Chattanooga with 4 divisions
- The remaining division would concentrate on repairing the Tennessee & Alabama running north through Columbia to Nashville in parallel to the line from Stevenson to Nashville
- BG Grenville Dodge was an experienced railroad builder, civil engineer and surveyor, known as "Level Eye" to the Native Americans out on the plains
- His 8,000 man division, with limited equipment, completed the job in 40 days, rebuilding 182 bridges and a similar number of culverts and relaying 102 miles of track



Sherman (3)

- By 1 November, Sherman had reached Florence which was only mid-way between Memphis and Chattanooga
- By 8 November, he reached Fayetteville, 70 miles as the crow flies from Stevenson, or 100 if he followed the railroad, which he did
- The going became even more difficult and the rains came
- 13 November, he arrived at Bridgeport in advance of his troops where he received a message from Grant urging him to hurry on to Chattanooga the next day to discuss a plan developed by Grant, Smith and Thomas

Grant

Grant (1)

- News of Longstreet's departure for Knoxville reached Grant on 5 November, which put him in a difficult position
- Burnside and Knoxville were at now risk and Washington was urging that "something should be done for his relief"
- But sending reinforcements would just add to Burnside's supply problem
- An immediate attack on Bragg looked like a better option
- However, the Cracker Line had only been open for a week and Thomas's troops would need more time to recover from near starvation
- Also, he needed well-fed artillery horses to support any attack
- And Sherman was still some weeks away
- Grant just had to respond to Washington's increasingly frantic demands as best he could and send encouraging messages to Burnside to hold on and play for time
- And he used the time to develop a plan to deal with Bragg

Grant (2)

- Sherman's army would attack Bragg's right flank on the north end of Missionary Ridge and gain control the railway, thereby separating Bragg from Longstreet
- The detailed planning was passed on to Smith and Thomas with the proviso that it would need Sherman's approval
- Smith's detailed reconnaissance and analysis of the terrain revealed two critical facts
- First, although the enemy on Lookout Mountain would have a clear view of Sherman's army when it crossed the bridge at Brown's Ferry, the column would disappear from sight after it passed over Moccasin Point
- Bragg would be at a loss to know whether they were moving to Knoxville or held on the north side of the river for operations at Chattanooga
- Second, Smith observed that the northern end of Missionary Ridge was lightly defended

Grant (3)

- The key feature at the northern end of Missionary Ridge was known as Tunnel Hill because of the railway tunnel through it
- Every available pontoon would be moved upstream, out of sight, to be floated downstream, replicating the Brown's Ferry manoeuvre
- Sherman's army would cross the river rapidly, capture Tunnel Hill and push on towards the railroad to cut Bragg's communications
- Simultaneously, Thomas would advance directly against Missionary Ridge to pin down the bulk of rebel army
- Deserters were reporting that Bragg was concerned about an attack on his left (southern) flank
- Sherman's first division across the river was to make a feint to the south towards Trenton to build on this concern

Grant (4)

- Thomas wanted Hooker attack Lookout Mountain at the same time, take it if possible, and press on to Rossville to cut off a retreat southwards
- Grant agreed, provisionally
- When Sherman viewed the terrain from the north side of the river on 14 November he boldly announced that he would take Tunnel Hill by 9.00 am on the appointed day
- This was set for 21 November giving Sherman enough time to bring his army up and across the river
- Naturally, Sherman wanted the maximum number of troops for his mission and Grant was willing to give Sherman whatever he wanted
- Grant therefore withdrew his approval for Thomas's plan to take Lookout Mountain because there would not be enough troops to do it all
- Sherman departed to bring up the Army of the Tennessee

Grant (5)

- As planned, the first division crossed the river and feinted towards Trenton
- From then on things did not go well for Sherman
- The rain and icy roads created significant difficulties and he had ignored Thomas's advice to leave his wagons so his march slowed to a crawl
- By 20 November, only one brigade was across Brown's Ferry
- The attack was postponed to 22 November and then to 23 November
- On 22 November, Union troops observed Confederate troops leaving their positions on Missionary Ridge
- Grant guessed, correctly, that Bragg was sending reinforcements to Longstreet
- He needed to act fast but Sherman wasn't ready

Bragg

Bragg (1)

- After Longstreet's departure, Bragg was left with just over 40,000 infantry and only 500 cavalry and he had to rearrange his lines
- Fearing attack from the south, he wanted to defend Lookout Mountain
- From the riverbank the mountain rises at a 45° slope, steepens and then flattens out about 2/3 of the way up forming a "bench", 150 to 300 yards wide, extending on both sides of the mountain.
- Above the bench it was steep again before the rocks became vertical
- Stevenson's Division (Breckenridge) (3 brigades) would hold the summit while Jackson (Hardee) would hold the bench with 3 brigades from Cheatham's Division, but Stevenson was in overall command
- Walker's Division (under Gist) would protect the base to the river
- Despite the advantage of height, the generals believed that the mountain was going to be hard to defend

Bragg (2)

- Breckenridge, in command of the centre and right on Missionary Ridge, was left to defend a position 5 miles long with just over 16,000 troops who were mostly entrenched in the valley
- Conditions were poor and desertions to the Union lines increased now that the Union forces had food
- Bragg had fallen for both of Grant's deceptions – the threatened attack from the south and the threat that Sherman would pose to Longstreet by marching to support Burnside
- 22 November, he split his army again and ordered Cleburne's Division and Buckner's Division (under the command of Bushrod Johnson) to march to Chickamauga station to board trains for Knoxville
- This would take 11,000 men away from Chattanooga at a crucial time

Orchard Knob
Grant
23 November 1863

Orchard Knob - 23 November (1)

- Grant believed that he had to disrupt this movement of troops to Knoxville and developed a plan to force Bragg to recall these troops
- Wood's Division would make a reconnaissance in force towards a feature known as Orchard Knob, about 100 ft high and roughly halfway towards Missionary Ridge
- Wood was to test the strength of the Confederate defences but to avoid a collision with the enemy and return to his current line
- Wood's 8,000 infantry formed ranks with great precision with flags flying and bands playing
- Sheridan's division lined up on his right and Howard's XI Corps (brought over from Lookout Valley to support Sherman) protected his left
- At 1:30 pm the command was given and Wood's and Sheridan's 14,000 troops moved forward at double-quick time

Orchard Knob - 23 November (2)

- The 600 bewildered defenders managed to get a single volley away before they broke and ran, or surrendered
- At 3:00 pm Wood signalled to Thomas "I have the first line of the enemy's entrenchments" and that he needed further instructions
- Grant agreed with Thomas that it would be better for morale for them to stay there and dig in
- This demonstration had the desired result, as Bragg promptly recalled Cleburne's Division which had not yet boarded the trains but it was too late to recall Bushrod Johnson
- Walker's Division (under Gist) was pulled back from the base of Lookout Mountain which forced Stevenson to send 2 brigades from the mountain to fill the gap left, weakening his defence overall
- Bragg put Hardee in command of the now vital right flank, while Breckenridge was given command of the centre

Orchard Knob - 23 November (3)

- Bragg and Breckenridge decided, after 2 months waiting in front of Chattanooga, that it would be prudent to fortify the crest of Missionary Ridge!
- Troops were given orders to start digging in and the artillery was brought up to the crest
- But nobody had done any reconnaissance of the most appropriate positions for artillery or for infantry and much of the work was done during the night and without any overall coordination
- The weaknesses in the placements would become apparent
- Worse, none of the 3 commanders was prepared to commit entirely to a defence of the crest, should an attack come against the centre
- The forces were split between the rifle pits at the base and the crest
- This would not turn out well

Orchard Knob - 23 November (4)


- Although the capture of Orchard Knob had been achieved with favourable odds of greater than 20:1, Thomas was pleased that his men had demonstrated that they were willing to leave the barricades to fight
- He was even more pleased when the Brown's Ferry bridge collapsed under the force of rising waters, trapping Osterhaus's Division of Sherman's army in Lookout Valley and the bridge would not be repaired for at least 12 hours
- Cruft's Division (IV Corps, 2 brigades) was also trapped there
- With Geary's Division, Hooker now had more than enough troops to make a serious attack on Lookout Mountain, as Thomas had wanted all along
- Grant finally acceded to Thomas's requests and ordered Hooker to make a demonstration against the mountain but he should "take the point only if his demonstration should develop its practicability"
- The subtlety was lost on Hooker who wanted to take the mountain

Orchard Knob - 23 November (5)

- Grant offered to Sherman that the attack could be delayed another day to allow Osterhaus to get across the river but Sherman was confident that his 3 divisions would be sufficient
- In any case, he could call on Jefferson Davis's division (XIV Corps) and Howard's 2 divisions (XI Corps)
- During the afternoon Sherman's troops marched from their concealed camps to their staging areas with the operation due to begin at midnight
- The first troops over the river would entrench on high ground while the remaining divisions would be ferried over
- Then the three divisions would advance against the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge and take Tunnel Hill

Orchard Knob - 23 November (6)

- Grant had given Sherman star billing in his production
- Grant had little confidence in Hooker, giving him a supporting role
- He had even less confidence in Thomas's troops, who were assigned the roles of extras, with 2 of their divisions (Davis, Cruft) now with Sherman and Hooker
- It was obvious to the troops that Grant did not believe that they had recovered, mentally, from the defeat at Chickamauga
- They resented this and had something to prove



**“Tunnel Hill”
Sherman
24 November 1863**

Sherman’s Command

- **XV Corps** under MG Francis Blair
 - ✧ BG Morgan Smith - BG Giles Smith, BG Joseph Lightburn
 - ✧ BG Hugh Ewing - Col John Loomis, BG John Corse, Col Joseph Cockerill
- **XVII Corps**
 - ✧ BG John Smith - Col Jesse Alexander, Col Green Raum, BG Charles Matthies
- **XI Corps** under MG Oliver O. Howard
 - ✧ BG Adolph von Steinwehr - Col Adolphus Buschbeck, Col Orland Smith
 - ✧ MG Carl Schurz - BG Hector Tyndale, Col Włodzimierz Krzyzanowski, Col Friedrich Hecker
- **XIV Corps**
 - ✧ BG Jefferson Davis – BG James Morgan, BG John Beatty, Col Daniel McCook

Sherman - 24 November

- The crossing began on schedule and by 6:30 am Sherman had 2 divisions assembled less than 2 miles from Missionary Ridge but he waited all morning for Ewing's division to cross rather than moving forward
- When the fog lifted and Bragg saw that Sherman was south of the river, he called for Cleburne to send one brigade to defend the ridge and for one brigade from Cheatham's Division to resist Sherman's crossing!
- With such a weak response, Bragg had handed Sherman an opportunity to destroy his army, but Sherman didn't take it
- Sherman slowly and cautiously made his way to the top of - Billy Goat Hill
- There was a valley between him and Tunnel Hill!
- With 50 minutes of daylight remaining he decided to dig in for the night
- Cleburne took full advantage of this reprieve to bring up his remaining brigades and prepare his defences
- Sherman had fluffed his lines, badly

Patrick Cleburne



- Born 1828 in Ireland
- Served 3 years in the British Army
- Emigrated to the USA ~ 1850
- Settled in Arkansas as businessman and then lawyer
- He joined the Confederate army and he became known as the 'Stonewall of the West'
- Federal troops dreaded to see the blue flag of Cleburne's Division across the battlefield
- He was unable gain promotion because of unsound views on slavery
- Killed in the Battle of Franklin in 1864
- *'Where this division defended, no odds broke its line; where it attacked, no numbers resisted its onslaught, save only once; and there is the grave of Cleburne.'* W J Hardee

The Battle Above the Clouds
Lookout Mountain
Hooker
24 November 1863



BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN

Hooker's Command

- **XII Corps**
 - ✧ BG John W. Geary - Col George Cobham, BG George Greene
- **XIV Corps**
 - ✧ BG Charles Cruft - BG Walter Whitaker, Col William Grose
- **XV Corps**
 - ✧ BG Peter Osterhaus - BG Charles Woods, Col James Williamson

Hooker - 24 November

- Despite Grant's limited confidence in him, Hooker and his staff worked until midnight perfecting their plans
- 3 divisions from 3 different Corps had never fought together
- Geary started at dawn from Wauhatchie, crossing Lookout Creek, and moving north towards the point
- The remaining brigades were fed into the attack along the way while the Confederates were subjected to a massed artillery fire
- The smoke, the fog and a few clouds led to the description of the Battle Above the Clouds, which was not accurate – Grant described it as “poetry” and barely even a battle – which was even less accurate
- The Confederates fought hard all day despite poor leadership but were slowly forced back and during the night they withdrew
- The next morning, when the fog lifted, there was a Union flag flying on top of Lookout Mountain for all to see



Tunnel Hill
Sherman
25 November 1863

Sherman - 25 November (1)

- Hooker's success was of little interest to Grant, the "battle" had just been a diversion to keep Bragg thinking the attack would come from the south
- Everything rested on Sherman's success – he was "to attack the enemy at the point most advantageous from your position at early dawn"
- Thomas was ordered to prepare his men for an attack on the rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge in cooperation with Sherman
- Grant assumed that Sherman was close to achieving his initial objective and would be rolling up the line along the ridge and Thomas needed to be ready to join in immediately when word came through
- Grant didn't want or need Hooker to be involved, but Thomas flouted Grant's direction and called Hooker down to the valley so as to protect his own right from a flanking attack
- Now Grant discovered that Sherman was a long way from taking Tunnel Hill

Sherman - 25 November (2)

- Rather than move at dawn, Sherman hesitated
- He had 16,000 troops in 4 divisions facing Cleburne's 4,000 in 3 brigades
- Despite having the greater numbers, Sherman waited until 8:00 am before he ordered 2 brigades to attack one from the north and one from the north west
- They were thrown back again and again
- Sherman threw more units in the battle from the west – same result
- He kept attacking head on with only a fraction of his force at any one time
- While Cleburne was fully stretched in holding them off, he was receiving a steady flow of reinforcements and he had the advantage of interior lines
- By early afternoon, it became clear that Sherman had failed and Grant's plan was rapidly falling apart

Thomas's Command

- **XIV Corps** under MG John Palmer
 - ✧ BG Absolom Baird – Col Edward Phelps, Col Ferdinand Van Derveer, BG John Turchin
- **IV Corps** under MG Gordon Granger
 - ✧ BG Thomas Wood - BG Samuel Beatty, BG August Willich, BG William Hazen
 - ✧ MG Philip Sheridan - BG George Wagner, Col Charles Harker, Col Francis Sherman
- **XIV Corps** under MG John Palmer
 - ✧ BG Richard Johnson – Col William Stoughton, BG William Carlin

Thomas - 25 November (1)


- Back at Orchard Knob, Grant and Thomas were not happy
- Thomas's troops had been kept waiting most of the day
- Hooker's advance towards the Rossville Gap had stalled because the retreating Confederates had burnt the bridge and there were few materials available to build a replacement
- Thinking Sherman needed more reinforcements, Grant sent Baird's division north but Sherman advised that he didn't need more troops
- Baird came back into Thomas's line to the north which meant that Granger's two divisions were flanked by Palmer's two
- Finally at 3:00 pm Grant had had enough of waiting and suggested to Thomas "Don't you think it's about time to advance against the rifle pits?"
- Thomas ignored him, waiting for a specific order
- He felt his troops were going to be sacrificed in order to make Sherman's task easier as Bragg called troops back to defend the centre

Thomas - 25 November (2)

- At 3:30 pm Grant lost patience and issued the order
- The four divisions would advance when 6 guns were fired in succession, 23,000 troops along a 3 mile front across a mile of open ground
- But what were they expected to do?
- The orders were to take the rifle pits at the base and halt there
- Baird understood the orders but couldn't believe them
- In the rifle pits they would be at their most vulnerable, so he decided to go for the summit
- Wood understand the order but his regimental commanders claimed they were unsure where they were supposed to stop
- Sheridan was befuddled and so were his subordinates
- And Johnson wasn't really sure what he was supposed to do
- William Carlin, one of his 2 brigadiers, told his troops not to stop until they reached the top

Thomas - 25 November (3)

- What orders were given to their opponents?
- Some, but not all, of the troops in rifle pits were told to wait until the Yankees came within 200 yards, fire a single volley and retire up the slope, skirmishing as they went
- That they would be exhausted by the time they reached the crest and they would be blocking the fire from the defenders on the crest did not seem to have been considered
- In any case the line on the crest was mostly too far back to be of much use for firing downwards – it was on the “topographical crest” rather than the “military crest”
- There were too many undulations, projections, descents and ravines to provide an adequate line of fire and the artillery was too dispersed
- As well there were no reserves anywhere along the line



Thomas - 25 November (4)

- When the Union troops moved into the open, they moved from quick time to double-quick time, in some cases to an uncontrolled run
- The Confederate artillery overshot initially but gradually began to find their range but the guns were too thinly spread to do a lot of damage
- Some of the defenders did as ordered, firing a volley and then running back up the hill
- Others stayed and fought until they were overrun, or saw their fellow troops “running away” and joined them
- There was confusion as they scrambled up the slopes
- Even more so when they got to the top and scrambled over the barricades

Thomas - 25 November (4)


- The attackers halted at the pits, at which point it became clear that this position was untenable both from rifle fire from above and artillery using canister
- Survival suggested the base of the mountain was a safer place to be or even the top
- Some units started to climb the ridge in close pursuit of the enemy
- Chants of “Chickamauga, Chickamauga” rang out as they taunted the Confederates
- There was complete confusion and the units fell into disarray
- Troops started to follow whichever colour bearer was closest or take whichever route offered the safest passage towards the top
- From a distance they looked like flocks of migratory birds in V-shaped groups forming and reforming as they continued up the ridge





Thomas - 25 November (5)

- Grant was horrified
- This had all the makings of a complete disaster
- He demanded to know who had ordered those men to the ridge?
- Thomas responded “I don’t know. I did not”
- Granger happily remarked that “When those fellows get started all hell can’t stop them”
- Grant muttered that somebody was going to suffer professionally
- Sheridan’s losses were particularly heavy because their climb was the most exposed but the Confederate could not hold them everywhere
- By 5:00 pm, the first Union troops had reached the crest and quickly overwhelmed the defenders
- Some were pushed back but weight of numbers won the day and the Confederate line started to disintegrate

Thomas - 25 November (6)

- To the south, Hooker had finally got his troops across the creek and arrived at the Rossville Gap
- He quickly improvised an attack on the weakly defended flank
- Geary's division moved along western side seeking a point of attack, Osterhaus's division went east to catch the rebels as they retreated, while Cruft's division went up the ridge and started rolling up the line
- Bragg desperately tried to restore order and rally his troops but by now it was a near complete rout with troops in full flight discarding their gear as they ran down the eastern slope and Bragg had to join them
- However, pursuit was limited as the Union troops were exhausted and it was getting dark
- As well, there was no cavalry to support an active pursuit that night





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Ringgold Gap
 Hooker
 27 November 1863

Hooker - 27 November

- With the Army of Tennessee in full retreat, Bragg directed them towards Ringgold on the railway line to Atlanta where there was a range of mountains to get behind
- Grant always favoured pursuit in force but he had another problem to solve
- Lincoln wired "Well done. Many thanks to all. Remember Burnside."
- So Grant sent Hooker to chase Bragg while he organised for Sherman to go to Burnside's aid
- Bragg, sensibly, gave the task of holding the Ringgold Gap to Cleburne
- Hooker was not up to the task and his disjointed attacks were thrown back
- When Bragg was ready, he called Cleburne to withdraw as did Grant with Hooker
- Bragg resigned on 1 December but not before he had blamed many, many others for the defeat





The Knoxville Campaign Burnside & Longstreet 4 - 29 November 1863

Ambrose Burnside



- Born 1824 in Indiana
- His father had been a slave owner in the south
- But he freed them when he moved to Indiana
- West Point graduate, resigned from the army in 1853
- He set up the Burnside Arms Co. making the Burnside Carbine
- He was ruined financially when the Secretary of War, Floyd, was bribed by a competitor to break a major contract
- He is remembered for his failings at Antietam, Fredericksburg (as commander of the Army of the Potomac) and, later, for the Crater at Petersburg
- He was intelligent and personable but weak as a leader

Burnside & Longstreet – 4- 29 November (1)

- Longstreet set out for Knoxville but the trains were inadequate and the supplies he'd been promised didn't arrive
- As well, the bridges were destroyed so he had to take a longer route
- Burnside had taken Grant's advice to delay the advance which he did with some skill, sending 5,000 troops to hinder Longstreet's progress through a staged retreat
- His troops beat the Confederates by 15 minutes to a key road junction at Campbell's Station on 16 November
- BG William Sanders skilfully led his cavalry until he was mortally wounded by a sharpshooter from a nearby house
- Burnside's troops retreated into Knoxville where they renamed the key fortification Fort Sanders in his memory
- Longstreet was short on supplies but, hearing that Bushrod Johnson (but not Cleburne) was coming up, decided to wait

Burnside & Longstreet – 4- 29 November (2)

- Longstreet planned his dawn attack carefully
- Burnside had also planned carefully but with more innovation
- The Confederates started tripping over telegraph wire strung at knee and ankle height between the trees, slowing them up and their cries and curses alerting the defenders
- The walls of Fort Sanders were made of earth but the ditch was 9 feet deep and not the expected 5 feet and they did not bring scaling ladders
- As well the defenders watered the walls making them slippery and/or icy
- And 2 guns were set up to provide enfilading fire along the ditch
- It was slaughter and over in 20 minutes
- His 813 casualties were nearly double the total defenders (440)
- Burnside offered Longstreet a truce to remove his dead – he accepted
- With Sherman coming up, Longstreet took his army back to Virginia
- **Tennessee was now firmly under Union control**

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